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When, and why, did Frege read Bolzano?*
GORAN SUNDHOLM
1. Lack of Evidence?
Michael Dummett wrote:
The only nineteenth-century philosopher of whom it would be reasonable to
guess, just from the content of his writings and those of Frege, that he had
influenced Frege, is Bernhard Bolzano, who died in the year Frege was
born; but there is no evidence whatever that Frege ever read Bolzano.'
Subsequently he was taken to task by Wolfgang Kiinne for having made
the 'grave mistake' of misspelling 'Bernard', the first name of Bolzano.2
However, in my opinion, this is not the only mistake in the quote from
Dummett. In the present note I wish to dispute that 'there is no evidence
whatever that Frege ever read Bolzano'. On the contrary, by combining two
well-known sets of facts, I shall argue, one obtains strong evidence that
Frege did read Bolzano late 1905 or early 1906.3
2. The Missing Link: Alwin Korseil
It has been noted in the literature that Frege's partners (victims?) in scholarly
discussion drew his attention to the works of Bolzano at least three times.4 First,
' My lecture at LOGiCA '99 dealt with the dating of Frege's distinction between Sinn and Be-
deutung, and wi l l appear in the History and Philosophy of Logic. However, given the Bolzano
connection, what follows might not be out of place in a LOGICA Yearbook published in Prague.
The material was presented in 1998 at workshops in Leyden and Helsinki. 1 am indebted to
participants for helpful discussion. Kai Wehmeier and Helge Rücken, presently both at Leyden
University, offered detailed comments on the penultimate draft.
1
 [1991, p. vii] . Dummett is not alone in his view. See, for instance, Mancosu [1996, p. 117, fn.
69]: 'As is well known there is no evidence that Frege ever read Bolzano, since he never quotes
him', and Künne [1997, p. 203]: 'Husserl, Kerry and Korselt were critical of Frege, and Frege in
turn was very critical of them. Perhaps that's why he never bothered to read [Bolzano] an author
they praised, -who knows ...T.
1
 [1997, p. 203].
3
 William Boos in his pioneering [1985, pp. 156-7] suggests en passant that Frege's work on
independence was not independent from Bolzano, but refrains from working out his suggestion
further.
" For instance, in Picardi [1994] and Kunne [1997aj.
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Benno Kerry made ample use of the Wissenschaftslehre in several installments
of his lengthy series of articles.5 However, Frege does not appear to have taken
the hint, since careful search has yielded no traces of direct influence from
Bolzano in his writings from the Hochleistungsperiode 1890-95. Thus, as far as
mediation through Benno Kerry is concerned, I am prone to agree with Dum-
mett: there is no supporting evidence, in the form of even remotely Bolzanian
passages, in Frege's writings prior to, say, Grundgesetze, Voi. II from 1903, or
at least, none has been found.6
The relevance of Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre for his logical concerns
was pointed out to Frege yet again — and this time quite forcefully so — in
1903 and 1905/6. First Alwin Korselt firmly pointed Frege in the direction of
the Wissenschafislehre: Frege inaugurated his acrimonious debate with
David Hubert on the foundations of geometry in private letters, but when
Hubert did not agree to publication of their correspondence, Frege, true to his
polemical habits, brought the matter into public view through a two-part
article entitled Ober die Grundlagen der Geometrie, in [1903] Korselt, who
had corresponded with Frege concerning Russell's paradox, intervened in the
debate with Hubert and attempted to take an intermediate stand between
Frege and Hubert.1 He also published (an essay on the foundations of
mathematics that amounts to) a critical notice [1905] of Frege's recent Gg II.
In virtually all his writings on the foundations of mathematics Korselt refers
to Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre in the most enthusiastic terms. In particular,
in the two early pieces aimed directly at Frege, Korselt informs him, with
singular lack of tact, that he would have avoided many mistakes by taking the
trouble to study Bolzano:
Die modernen Mathematiker wären nicht in Widersprüche oder Verwor-
renheiten ... gefallen, wenn sie Bolzanos "Wissenschaftslehre" ...
studiert hätten. B o l z a n o , der große Gegner K a n t s , ist seit L e i b n i z
der erste philosophische Mathematiker und mathematische Philosoph.8
' See Peckhaus (I994J and Picardi [1994] for bibliographical references and further information
concerning Kerry.
6
 This passage might need revision. When the present paper was essentially complete Professor
Ettore Casari (Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa) presented me with copies of a number of his
writings on Bolzano. In particular, if I have deciphered the Italian correctly, Casari [1989]
strongly suggests that Bolzano's theory of meaning is a "forgotten" source for Frege's theory of
Sinn and Bedeutung. An evaluation of this intriguing possibility will have to wait for another
occasion. Kunne [1997] spells out similarities between the theories of Frege and Bolzano in
considerable detail.
7
 For the letters, see \VB, pp. Î40-4. Relevant articles by Korselt are listed in the references. Î am
indebted to Dr. Volker Peckhaus (Erlangen) for giving me access to his unpublished LA!win
Rheinhold Korselt' that, apert from biographical material, contains convenient bibliographical
summaries.
1
 Korselt [1903, p. 495). The WB letters show that Korselt knew of Russell's paradox by June 1903.
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Frege's scholarly temper was notoriously short. Being publicly reminded,
at this particular juncture (1903!), of the fact that "modern mathematicians"
have fallen into contradiction, and that they could have avoided these pitfalls
by studying Bolzano, is not something that would greatly endear the author
ofthat remark to Frege. Also, he would not have liked to see Bolzano being
put so firmly in the place of the first (or foremost) mathematical philosopher
and philosophical mathematician after Leibniz; that place, I suspect, Frege
reserved for himself. Korselt is equally tactless in his "critical notice" of
Ggll:
Und doch erstrebte schon Le ibn iz , ein Begründer der modernen
Mathematik, die Erforschung ihrer Grundlagen. Bolzano, sein geistiger
Nachfolger, hat zwar einigen Einfluß gewonnen, aber seine ganze mathe-
matisch-logisch-erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung, die sich in seiner
"Wissenschaftslehre" offenbart, ist noch lange nicht ausgenutzt. Kein
wunder, da nicht einmal die der Gegenwart näher liegenden Schriften von
Frege ... Beachtung gefunden haben. ...
Der Verfasser ... möchte nun diejenigen Bemerkungen Freges
widerlegen, die ihm unrichtig oder übertrieben erscheinen.9
Frege was a master polemicist, and he, of all philosophers, was most cer-
tainly not prepared to be hectored by his inferiors. Thus, when Frege joins
battle again to fire the three shots of his second salvo, also entitled Über die
Grundlagen der Geometrie, his tone has been harshened considerably and
may with some justice be called unpleasant.10
The third time that Frege's attention was drawn to Bolzano can be found
in the later part of the correspondence with Husserl. In 1906, Husserl's Vth
and last survey of the German publications on logic during the period 1895
to 1899 dealt with the final two articles of Anton Marty's series on subject-
less sentences. The article in question formed the occasion for the resumption
of the correspondence between Frege and Husserl In Husserl's article Bol-
zano figures more or less prominently, and the same is true also for his letter
(presumably no longer extant, but see Wehmeier - Schmidt am Busch
[2000]) to Frege of 10.11.1906, as we know from Scholz's gloss on the con-
tent."
9
 Korselt [1905, p. 364].
0
 [1906, MI!]. !n these ankles, Hubert having been dismissed already in the first series, Korselt
serves as Frege's main target. Examples of Frege's sharp use of invective are collected by Wil-
liam Boos[!985].
" Husserl [1904, p. 103, fn.* and p. 112]. The letter in question from Husserl to Frege carries the
code XIX/4 in WB, p. 104.
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3. Frege on the (In)Dependence of Geometrical Axioms
If Kerry's mention of Bolzano did provoke Frege into reading the Wissen-
schaftslehre, the study left no readily visible impact on his oeuvre. Matters
are different with respect to this second (Korselt/Husserl) round of Bolzano-
pointers. In the very works that Frege published in direct response to Kor-
selt's prompting we find passages unmistakably reminiscent of Bolzano. To
be specific, in UGG2:III we read:
(I)
Es sei nun Q eine Gruppe von wahren Gedanken. Aus einem oder einigen
Gedanken dieser Gruppe möge durch einen logischen Schluß ein Ge-
danke G folgen, so daß dabei außer logischen Gesetzen kein nicht zur
Gruppe Q gehörender Satz gebraucht wird. Wir bilden nun eine neue
Gruppe von Gedanken, indem wir der Gruppe fJ den Gedanken G hinzu-
fügen. Was wir so getan haben, mag ein logischer Schritt heißen. Wenn
wir nun durch eine Folge von solchen Schritten, bei der jeder Schritt das
Ergebnis des vorangehenden zum Ausgang nimmt, eine Gruppe von
Gedanken erreichen können, die den Gedanken A enthält, so nennen wir
A abhängig von der Gruppe fi. Wenn dies nicht möglich ist, so nennen
wir A unabhängig von Q. Dies wird immer stattfinden wenn A falsch ist.l2
Frege's notion of dependence holds among true propositions only: when
a Thought (proposition) A is dependent on a group Q of Thoughts the latter
all have to be true. For Frege this must be so, since when A is dependent on
Q there is a chain of logical inferences from Q to A, and, according to Frege,
one can only infer from truths. Considering the one-premiss case only:
(*) The true Thought A is dependent on the true Thought B when there
is a chain of valid inferences from B to A.
(ÏI)
:
Indem wir einen logischen Schritt von der Gedankengruppe Q aus ma-
chen, wenden wir ein logisches Gesetz an. Dieses ist nicht zu den Prämis-
sen zu rechnen, braucht also in fi nicht vorzukommen. Es gibt also ge-
wisse Gedanken, nähmlich die logischen Gesetze, die bei der Frage nach
der Abhängigket nicht mitzurechnen sind.13
12
 [1906, pp. 423-4],
"|1906, P. 424).
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Here Frege hit on a point that has become familiar through Lewis Carrol!
[S895]: on pain of an infinite regress, the rule of inference according to
which a certain inference is drawn, is not to be counted among the premises
for the inference in question. Frege does not spell out the regress, though.
But for the above explanation of the notion of dependence, Frege also
gave another, partial, criterion for independence, which is formulated in
terms of changing "vocabularies". In recent secondary literature this has been
seen as an exercise anticipating contemporary ("Tarskian") logical theory,
thereby proving how farsighted Frege must have been.H The crucial text
runs:
(III)
Es handele sich nun darum, ob ein Gedanke G von einer Gruppe Q von
Gedanken abhängig sei. Wir können diese Frage verneinen, wenn mittels
unseres Vokabulars den Gedanken der Gruppe Q die Gedanken einer
Gruppe Q' entspechen die wahr sind, während dem Gedanken G ein
Gedanke G' entspricht, der falsch ist; denn wenn G von O abhängig
wäre, so müsste, da die Gedanken von fi' wahr sind, auch G' von Q' ab-
hängig sein, und dann wäre G'wahr.15
According to this characterisation in terms of independence, the thought
A is independent from B if there is a "vocabulary" V for the non-logical parts
of A and B, such that B', that is, the result of translating B according to the
vocabulary V, is true, whereas A', that is A under the same vocabulary V, is
false. The first, direct characterisation of dependence in terms of inference
is applicable to true thoughts only, whereas this second characterisation in
terms of vocabularies makes sense also for arbitrary (groups of) Thoughts,
irrespective of their truth.
Frege formulates his second (partial) criterion as a sufficient condition
only: in the presence of a "counter-vocabulary", dependence cannot hold. If
we regard this sufficient condition also as necessary, a second characterisa-
tion of dependence - in terms of vocabularies - is readily forthcoming. Thus:
(#) A is not independent from B, '\fA is not false under any vocabulary
which makes B true.
14
 See Steiner [1964-5], Kreiser [1973], Resnik [1974], Kambartel [1975], Boos [1985], Demo-
polous [1985], Blancheue [1996], Wehmeier [1997], Ricketts [1997], Tappenden [1997]. Resnik,
Boos and Demopolous mention Bolzano. Detnopolous even suggests thai Frege deserves credit
for anticipating Tarski's treatment of logical consequence. Such credit might be his due, //"the
work is independent of Bolzano. On balance, it seems more likely that Frege knew Bolzano's
work when he wrote the final part of ÜGG2, than that he did not.
i!
 [1906, p. 428].
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From the classical, non-constructive point of view that was shared by
Frege and Bolzano, this condition (#) is equivalent to:
(**) A is dependent on B if A is true under any vocabulary which makes
B true.
For Frege, the condition (*) clearly entails (**), since the inferences of
the chain have to preserve truth from premisses to conclusions. In the ab-
sence of a completeness-theorem for vocabularies, the opposite direction is
unclear. Anything which can be refuted by a counter-vocabulary is certainly
independent, but does it also hold that everything which cannot be obtained
by logical inference from certain premisses can also be refuted under a suit-
able "counter-vocabulary"?
4. Bolzano, Ableitbarkeit and formale Abfolge
A comparison of the three passages (1) - (III) with Bolzano's Wissenschaft-
slehre reveals striking similarities. The fragment (I) presents Bolzano's no-
tion of Abfolge between true propositions, as is shown by inspection of WL
§§ 162, 198, 199, and 220." In fact, the sequence of propositions {A,,..., At>,
where A, e O and At ~ A, is nothing but a branch in the tree which serves as
Bolzano's pictorial representation of das Geschäft des Aufsleigens von der
Folge zu ihrem Grunde - the process of ascending from consequence to
ground - with respect to the Wahrheit an sich A {§ 220).
Frege's rider in (II), concerning the role of logical laws was not original
with him, nor for that matter, was Carroll's Tortoise the first to run the re-
gress. Bolzano had already considered the matter fully in § 199 of WL,
which bears the tell-all title Ob auch die Schlußrede] mit zu den Teilgründen
einer Schlußwahrheit gezählt werden könne - Whether also the rule of in-
ference could be counted among the grounds for a true conclusion. As we
would expect, with the benefit of hindsight, Bolzano gave a negative answer,
precisely because of that very régressas ad infinitum, that is familiar from
Carroll's amusing presentation.
Boizano, however, did not only consider the notion of an Abfolge among
truths (Frege's Abhängigkeit). He also made use of the notion of an Ableit-
barkeit, which corresponds closely enough to our modern notion of conse-
quence among propositions, be it logical or not. Ableitbarkeit is a three-place
16
 Korselt [1903, p 405] explains (prior to mentioning Bolzano):
Ein Grundsatz a heißt abhängig von den Grundsätzen b, c, .... wenn a, b, c ... derselben
formalen Theone angehören und a nur scheinbar unmittelbarer Satz ist, vielmehr selbst oder
seine Verneinung zu den Sätzen b, c,... im Verhältnis da Abfolge steht, (my emphasis)
Passage I reads as. and if I am right is, Frege's attempt to spell out this Korselt sentence.
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relation between a proposition C, a sequence of propositions A\,..., A^ and
a collection F of Vorstellungen an sich which indicates the places at which
variation takes place..17 Frege's dual criterion for independence in frag-
ment (III) coincides with the Unabhängigkeit that Bolzano formulates in
§ 158.1, (with variation regarding all places not occupied by logical con-
stants). In fact, Korselt drew explicit attention to Bolzano's explanation of
independence among axioms:
Nur die Unabhängigkeil der Grundsätze bliebe fraglich, die Theorie hätte
möglicherweise noch nicht ihre einfachste Form erhalten. Dieser schon
Bolzano bekannte Begriff der "Unabhängigkeit und Verträglichkeit"
von Sätzen wird wohl nicht mehr in Vergessenheit geraten, nachdem
Huber t ihn so glänzend verwertet hat.18
For Frege, however, the direct criterion is applied only among truths.
Thus his notion of Abhängigkeil, which is characterised directly in terms of
inference, and indirectly in terms of preservation of truth under variation of
vocabularies, strongly resembles (or is but a variant of) Bolzano's notion of
formale Abfolge.
5. The Missing Link (Part ii); Confirmation
Paolo Maneosu observes that the Wissenschafstlehre § 530 contains a treat-
ment, contra Kant, which shows how to eliminate assumptions of false
propositions from indirect proofs." Frege, in his 1914 lectures on Logik in
der Mathematik, offers exactly the same treatment, even down to the fine
details of the identical geometrical example.20 Maneosu concludes:
[Frege] did this by employing Bolzano's strategy either by hitting on it
independently or by borrowing it directly from the Wissenschaftslehre. Of
course, there is also the possibility that Frege was influenced by some
other work containing Bolzano's reduction or one similar to it. But until I
am shown such a text, 1 will opt for a direct influence of Bolzano on
Frege.21
17
 Contrary to the modern notion of consequence, Ableitbarkeit demands also that the antecedent
propositions are compatible {verträglich) (WL §155).
IS
 [1905, p. 387], Thus, Korselt considers exactly those two (Bolzanian) criteria., direct and
indirect, that are later discussed by Frege.
" Maneosu [1996, pp. 110-17], I am indebted to Paolo Maricosu for drawing my attention to this
passage in discussion after my Helsinki lecture.
20
 NS, pp. 264-6.
21[1996,p.ll7,fn.69]
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I entirely concur.
Remarkably enough, Alwin Korselt also drew attention to this treatment
in another article published in the Yearbook of the Society of German
Mathematicians in 1911:
Ein indirekter Beweis ist ein Umweg, eine Unvollkommenheit, die sich aber
wegschaffen läßt wie Bolzano in Wfissenschaftslehre} § 530 zeigt.22
That Frege read Korselt's articles of 1903 and 1905 we need not doubt.
They are published in a Yearbook that Frege took and both dealt directly
with his work. Did Frege read also this [191 i] article? Without doubt he did;
the opening unes of the aborted Schoenfliess-repiy show that Korselt and
Schoenfliess were both authors that he followed.23 Korselt [1911], however,
is a reply to an earlier paper of Schoenfliess in the Yearbook from the same
year. In his reply Korselt defends Frege's views on "Wortdefinitionen". This
paper is larded with an unusually high proportion - even for Korselt - of
references to Bolzano; it ends with the peroration:
S c h r ö d e r lässt manchmal die B o l z a n o s c h e Schärfe vermissen.
Die K a n t i s c h e n Antinomien dürfen uns von der Philosophie nicht
abschrecken, sie sind schon oft, insbesondere in W{issenschaftslehre}
§ 315 als Schein aufgedeckt worden.
Wenn es mir gelungen sein sollte, einige Dunkelheiten aufzuklären,
verdanke ich das nur der (häufig wörtlich angeführten) Wissenschafts-
lehre von B o l z a n o . Ich bitte den Leser, sie seiner Aufmerksamkeit zu
würdigen.
In my opinion Frege had already followed that piece of sound advice, and
he was to heed it yet again, as shown by Mancosu.
6. Post hoc, propter hoc
As I already stressed, both sets of circumstances - that Korselt and Husserl
prompt, or perhaps better, provoke, Frege with respect to Bolzano in 1905/6,
and that UGG2:III contains passages that strongly resemble Bolzano's treat-
ment in the Wissenschaftslehre - are well-known in the literature. My only
claim to novelty lies in the suggestion that in this case the temporal nexus is
also a causal one; post hoc really becomes propter hoc by interposing a
reading on Frege's part of the Wissenschaftslehre in late 1905 or early 1906.
This abduction provides the explanation of why Frege suddenly - otherwise,
22
 Korselt {!911, p. 366].
"NS, pp. 191-9.
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more or less out the blue - should turn to something that so very strongly
resembles (model-theoretic) consequence between Thoughts (propositions,
that is, judgeable contents), contrary to his lifelong insistence on the abso-
luteness of logical matters.2'1 Inference, on the other hand, in terms of which
Frege's treatments are invariably cast, is an act of passage from (known)
judgement(s) to a novel judgement, the conclusion, which gets known in the
act of inference, that is, the mediate act of judgement.25
On the strength of internal evidence I have argued that Frege did read Bol-
zano. Was it in fact possible for him to do so? It certainly was, as Dr. Uwe
Dathe, of the Philosophical Institute at Jena University, has been kind enough
to check.26 The University Library at Jena owns a set of Bolzano's collected
works from 1882. The acquisition is not dated, but from the library stamp and
binding it is clear that the set must have been obtained shortly after its appear-
ance. Unfortunately, the library ledgers for the years 1821-1899, which have
miraculously been retained, are in too bad a state to allow for any conclusion
whether Frege actually borrowed the work during that period.27
Finally, if, as I aver, Frege did read Bolzano, why does he not simply say
so? The answer here surely lies in his character: throughout his career Frege
never acknowledges, but always disagrees.28 His sprit seems to have been
essentially adversarial. He is the typical Gegner who only attacks, but who
cannot be bothered to agree.
Göran Sundholm
Institute for Philosophy
P.O.Box 9515
Leyden University
NL-230U RA Leyden
The Netherlands
sunholm@pop.wsd.LeidenUniv.nl
24
 Fairness bids me to remark that Frege [1903, p. 272] does discuss independence of axioms
prior to Korselt [1903], in terms that, with the benefit of hindsight and much good will, can be
seen as anticipatory of his [1906] treatment, where the use of "vocabularies" accommodates
points that were made in terms of various "geometries" - "A-geometry", "B-geometry", etc..
" Consequence is not an epistemic notion but preserves truth from proposition(s) to proposition,
whereas inference is epistemic and preserves knowability from premiss judgement(s) to conclu-
sion judgement. My LOGICA '97 lecture, that is, Sundholm [1998], spell this out in some detail.
!
' Private letter, November 26,1998.
"Of course, if I am right, a later loan, in 1905 or 1906, outside the period of the ledgers, would
be more likely.
is
 Frege's treatment of Lotze provides a good case in point. For details and references, see Ho-
vens[l997].
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